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IN THE SUPREME COUR.T 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LEROY HA vVKINS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
LORENE PERRY, .A.LF·RED T. 
PERRY, and MRS. R. A. SCRIE-
VER, sometimes kno,vn as THEL-
1\I.A_ SCRIEVER, 
Defendants and Appellant. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case~No. 
7786 
In the latter part of May, 1943 (page· 19) plaintiff, 
at that time a minor sixteen years of age (page 19, line 
24; page 27, line 22), com1nenced working with defend-
ant A. T. Perry (page 37, line 30), a minister of the 
Gospel (page 21, line 4; page 50, line 1), and a relative 
of plaintiffs (page 35, lines 22 and 23). About the mid-
dle of July, 1943 defendant, A. T. Perry, induced the 
plaintiff to give said defendant $300.00 to make a down 
pa)Tlnent on a hon1e at 2~3 East 7th South (pages 2·5, 26, 
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27 and 62) which $300.00· was given to said defendant 
in the presence of three witnesses (pages 25, 51, 63 and 
68). At the time the money was given to said defendant, 
A. T. Perry, said defendant told plaintiff that the proper-
ty would be taken in the name of Perry and when the 
plaintiff became of age it would be transferred to plain-
tiff (page 29, line 1; page 36, line 19; page 48, line 10; 
page 71, line 15) . 
On July 15, 1943 the contract of purchase was enter-
ed into having the names of J. F'. Taylor as the seller 
and A. T. Perry and Lorene Perry, his wife, as the 
buyers (see Exhibit A). 
That the plaintiff has resided in the home from the 
time of purchase up to the present time (pages 30, 78, 
80 and 81) while the defendants lived in the house only 
· until the early part of 1944 (pages 30, 43, 75, 78 and 82). 
The plaintiff has made all the monthly payments 
from the beginning of the contract until the present time 
(page 20, lines 29, 30; page 31, line 1), and is still mak-
ing the monthly payments. 
, The . Perrys and the Hawkins resided in the home 
from the time of the purchase until January of 1944, at 
which time the Perrys went to Portland, Oregon (page 
82'). Mrs. Perry claims that Mr. Hawkins was supposed 
to pay rent, pay the note and bank the money, but there 
was no testimony -that either Mr. Perry or Mrs. Perry, 
either by mail, directly or ip.directly, even though they 
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caine through Salt Lake in 1945 and saw the plaintiff, 
ever asked the plaintiff for an accounting, or for any 
1noney at all fro1n the ti1ne they left Salt Lake to the 
tin1e J)frs. Perry came to Salt Lake in August, 1949, 
at which ti1ne nirs. Perry testified she asked the plain-
tiff for son1e n1oney and plaintiff told defendant, Lorene 
Perry, he didn't have any for her (pages 85 and 86). 
Mrs. Perry never did pe!sonally tell the plaintiff· or 
clailn that the ho1ne was hers and she never did ask if 
she could move into her own home, or that it be given 
back to her (page 94, ~line 6). She did say they asked 
for $60.00 from plaintiff and received it (page 19) and she 
also asked for $50.00 which the plaintiff never sent to 
her (page 95). In neither case was the demand made· as 
if it was for money due and owing. 
The first time defendant, Lorene Perry, ·ever asked 
for the return of the property to. her was· after March 
14, 1950 after she had obtained her divorce from Mr. 
Perry on March 14, 1950 (page 87) and then notice was 
given by her attorney, a Mr. Hanni (page 86). See 
Exhibit "C", at which time there was no demand for 
rent, and notice wasn't given on the basis of non-pay-
ment for rent, but on the basis of a regular month to 
month tenancy. 
In the divorce decree Mrs. Perry was awarded the 
property but there was no showing that the plaintiff 
was served with sunnnons or ever advised that said real 
property was the subject matter of the suit, so that 
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the decree which was entered on March 14, 1950 would 
only settle the property rights between· defendants, 
A. T. Perry and Lorene Perry, and would have abso~ 
lutely no effect upon plaintiff's interest. 
There is a direct conflict as to who made the pay-
ments on the original contract and note. The plaintiff 
definitely testified that he made all the payments per-
sonally, except once or twice when plaintiff gave Mrs. 
Perry the payments when he had to go to work (pages 
30, 42 and 66). Mrs. Perry avers that she or her husband 
made the payments (pages 76, 77, 97 and 99). Actually 
there was no testimony to show that the ·Perrys made 
payments at all after January, 1944 when they left 
Salt Lake, and only six payments had become due up 
to the time the Perry left, so that the $100.00 per month 
payments were not paid up at the time of leaving. 
Mrs. Perry contended that the plaintiff was to pay 
rent himself, collect the rent on the apartment and make 
payments o:h the ,contract from the money collected 
(pages 82 and 83), while the plaintiff denies ever being 
a tenant (pages 33, 43 and 44). There was no evidence 
of any kind that the defendant, Perry, ever asked the 
plaintiff how much money plaintiff was supposed to have 
banked or collected or paid under the alleged instruc-
tions (page 84, lines 8 and 11). The only checking as to 
the status of the payments with the agent of defendant, 
Scriever, was done by Mrs. Perry after she returned 
in August of 1949 (pages 101 and 102). 
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The trial court found in favor of the plaintiff and 
against the defendants and decree was entered January 
7, 1951 (pages 115 to ·119) declaring the defendants, 
Perry, to be trustees for the use and benefit of the 
plaintiff and thereafter the court, upon motion of the 
defendants, having denied a motion for a new trial, made 
a minute order modifying the decree only to the extent 
that Lorene Perry has an equity in the property in the 
sum of $400.00 and except for such modification the 
judgment and decree was to stand as entered (page 123), 
and an a1nended decree entered so providing on Decem-
ber 11, 1951. Defendants have appealed the amended 
decree and the respondent cross appealed ~rom that 
portion of the amended decree allowing the defendants 
a lien of $400.00 (page 157) and the portion awarding 
to defendant Scriever $50.00 for attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT. OF· POINTS. 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT HAS MAD~ SUFFIClENT FIND-
INGS ON THE MATERIAL ISSUES TO SUPPORT THE 
JUDGMENT. 
II. 
THAT FINDINGS ON THE MATERIAL ISSUES ARE 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT. 
III. 
THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUP-
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PORT THE DECREE THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED 
TO THE FULL BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN THE PROP-
ERTY. 
IV. 
THAT THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO WAR-
RANT FINDINGS WHICH WOULD SUPPORT THE A WARD-
ING OF A $400.00 LIEN AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF'S 
INTEREST OR THE AWARDING OF $50.00 ATTORNEY'S 
FEE TO DEFENDANT SCRIEVER. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE LAW OF CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST. 
In this case the plaintiff admits that he is relying 
on the doctrine of constructive trust wherein equity 
requires the ·imposition of trust in such cases as the 
present instance. 
There are two theories on which a trust can be 
imposed upon this property: First, the enforcement of, 
a trust based on the purchase money agreement called 
a Resulting Trust and Second, the imposition of a Con-
structive Trust which may be imposed by reason of 
fraud, or confidential or fiduciary relationship. 
With respect to the resulting trusts generally, 
Bogart on Trust, S.ection 452, page 1350 states that re-
sulting trusts and uses were well known before the 
statute of frauds was written in 1786, and that the stat-
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ute of frauds had no application to resulting or con-
structive trust, and that the eighth section to old English 
rule referring back to the seventh section requiring in-
strmuents to be in writing stated: 
"The seventh section has no application to 
trusts \Yhich arise or result by the implication of 
the law." 
Quoting further : 
""In the U. S. where every express trust of 
realty is required to be manifested or proved by 
writing there is a section or clause corresponding 
to the English act excepting resulting trust. No 
matter what the particular wording of the except-
ing clauses the courts have been unanimous in 
holding that they were intended to cover all result-
ing and constructive trusts. It is, therefore·, com-
n1onplace that it is legally possible· for a cestui 
of a resulting trust to obtain a decree in his 
favor without introducing any documents setting 
forth the trust or introducing any written evi-
dence." 
Quoting fron1 Section 454, pages 1357 and 1358 of 
the same works it states: 
"The courts of equity have therefore estab-
lished the doctrine that normally the .payor of the 
purchase price of property, real or personal, is 
entitled to be decreed to be beneficiary of a trust 
if the conveyance runs to another with the con-
sent of the payor." 
In the the particular case at hand that IS exactly 
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the situation and the plaintiff is entitled to be declared 
the trustee of the property under the, theory of resulting 
trust .. 
The defendant makes much of the quotation, that to 
impose a resulting trust the title must be taken accord-
ing to the instructions of the person who pays the pur-
chase money. This was done in the preseent instance, as 
he took it in his name but added his wife's name. The 
mere addition of his wife's name would neither add or 
take away from the trust, and to cause a resulting trust 
to be defeated by such a device would be a travesty on 
justice, as any person could be instructed to take proper-
ty in his own name and be given the money for that 
purpose and then take the property in the name of still 
a third party and defeat the trust. 
In the present instance, if the, case fails as a result-
ing trust there is still the, fact that this is a constructive 
trust. 
In the present case if A. T. Perry took the property 
with the intention of having his wife's name put on the 
contract to defeat the very purpose of the payment of 
the $300.00 then there would have been an intentionally 
false and verbal promise accompanied by an element of 
positive fraud and the trust would be ex maleficio as 
set forth in Chadwick v. Arnold as quQted in appellants' 
brief. This is supported by Scott on Trusts, see Sec. 
440.1, page 2243. It states as follows: 
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..,Silnilarly ~~A" can enforce a constructive 
trust where he directed HB" to use "A's" money 
in purchasing land in the name of "A" but "B" 
wrongfully used ''A's" Inoney in purchasing the 
land in his o'vn nan1e. Here also "A" can follow 
his money into the land. In these cases "B" holds 
the land upon a constructive trust rather than a 
resulting trust." 
In Scott as quoted by appellant we see nothing that 
'vould defeat the trust. Putting Lorene Perry's name 
on the contract would only change the trust from result-
ing to constructive trust. 
The law has set up the constructive trust to do away 
with· the fraud in the taking of property, and the courts 
have said, as set forth in Bogart on Trust, in Section 
481, page 76, that where p·ersons act by an intermediary, 
Ruch as minors, spendthrifts, or mentally incompetent 
there is a fiduciary relationship. Equity has always 
taken an ·active interest of fostering and protecting these 
intimate relationships which it· calls fiduciary. It has 
exclusively developed one of the most important of rela-
tionships, nan1ely: the trust. 
Section 481, pages 78 and 79 states: 
"The exact lin1it of the ter1n, "fiduciary rela-
tions are i1npossible of statement." Equity re-
fuses to bind itself by an all inclusive definition. 
It reserves the freedon1 to declare relationships 
to be fiduciary upon the particular facts of the 
case." 
10 
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Quoting further on "Confidential Relationships," 
page 81, Section 482, under constructive trust, it states: 
"But there are other cases where there are 
just as great intimacy, disclosure of secrets, 
intrusting of power and superiority of position 
in the case of the representative but where the 
law has no special designation for the position 
of the parties it cannot be called trustee or execu-
torship and yet is so similar in its operation that 
it should have like results." 
It sets out the case of the sickly father deeding 
property to his son to be used for a specific purpose 
which failed as a specific trust, but due to the kinship 
the court felt justified in holding the son to be trustee 
of the father at the time the deed was made and that 
the disparity of position because of age, youth, education 
or mental weakness in confidential relationships may 
cause the court to look upon the representative as trustee 
for the weaker party and cites the parishioner and the 
priest, supported by numerous cases cited in annotation 
on pages 81 to 87 under the section. This theory is shown 
at pages 9'2 and 93 of the same work. It reads as follows: 
"Some other courts have stated that in a 
confidential relationship the principal is entitled 
to believe the statute of fraud will not be asserted. 
"Others have asserted the confidential rela-
tion doctrine is employed to prevent the statute 
of frauds from being an instrument of fraud." 
Mr. Tanner sets forth that the statute of frauds 
.Jf 
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prevent~ a deed under an oral pro1nise to be held for 
another. 
Section 495 of the san1e \Vorks states that a deed 
under an oral pron1ise to hold for another generally is 
prevented by the statute of frauds, but sets forth excep-
tional cases, and one of these is the confidential relation-
ship, and under Section 496 quotes Foresman v. Fores-
·Jnan, 167 N.E. 148, as follows: 
•'The rule is now well settled by repeated 
judgments of this court that. the statute (Statute 
of Frauds) does not obstruct the recognition of 
c.onstructive trust affecting an interest in land 
\Vith a confidential relationship would be abused 
if there were repudiation of a trust already de-
clared." 
In Haws v. Jensen, Supra, the court further sets 
forth the rule as follows : 
"A constructive trust being an equitable rem-
edy to prevent unjust enrichn1ent arises by opera-
tion of the law and is not within the Statute of 
Frauds." 
In Haws v. Jensen there is also cited a quotation 
from Scott on Trust, Volume 1, Section 44.2 as cited 
and set forth verbatim in appellant's brief at page 13. 
This very clearly sets forth the theory that trusts will 
be i1nposed 'vhere there is a fiduciary or confidential 
relationship. 
·&I, 
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We do not disagree with the theory as cited in Chad-
wick v. Arnold., Sup,ra., but contend that the holding 
strengthens the case of the respondent as the placing 
of the name of defendant, Lorene Perry, on th.e contract 
would be an element of positive fraud. 
Inasmuch as there are also facts in the record which 
clearly show a confidential or fiduciary relationship even 
if the rule set forth in Chadwick v. Arnold fails as to 
trusts ex maleficio then the ruling of Chadwick v. Arnold 
would not apply and the rule as set forth in Haws v. 
Jensen, Supra would more correctly state the law of this 
particular case. 
We cite appellant's brief, page 14, second paragraph 
in support of our contention which requirements as there 
set forth are exactly as we contend for the evidence in 
this case: (1) there was confidential or fiduciary rela-
tionship; (2) defendant took property in his own name 
intending to convey when plaintiff reached his majority; 
(3) defendant breached his agreement. 
Clearly from all the evidence presented there is 
ample ground for the establishment of a constructive 
trust . by. reason of the fiduciary relationship, namely: 
fellow workers working together and the plaintiff was 
a relative of the defendant and on the same basis the 
imposition of a constructive trust by reason of the con-
fidential relationship between the two parties. 
Further, the very disparity in the age as previously 
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set forth would be sufficient grounds for equity to iln-
pose a constructive trust. 
· II. 
THE TRIAL COURT HAS MADE SUFFICIENT FIND-
INGS ON THE MATERIAL ISSUES TO SUPPORT THE 
JUDGMENT. 
In the original findings of fact and conclusions of 
law the trial court found that Alfred T. Perry entered 
into a contract to purchase and was trustee for the 
benefit of the plaintiff (page 115, paragraph 3). 
On the 16th day of November, 1951 the Judge by 
a minute order, shown at page 123, ordered that the 
decree be modified and amended to provide that Lorene 
Perry have an equity of $400.00 against the Perrys. That 
except for the modification, the judgment and decree 
were to remain as heretofore set up~ 
That prior thereto, after considerable argument and 
discussion, by counsel for both sides, the judge in at-
tempting to mollify (in the opinion of these attorneys) the 
appellant had made the above order. Pursuant to the 
form thereto and now relies on the failure to include, 
above mentioned order the appellant prepared the 
amended findings of fact and conclusions of law to con-
reversal. It has been held in a nurnber of instances that 
con1plete findings in the amended findings as basis for 
if there are to be specific findings on particular ques-
tions they must be requested. Here if the appellant had 
l'f 
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wanted findings he should have so requested them, and 
we do ~ot feel now that he· should be· allowed to complain 
that they are not complete findings. However, we feel 
it would have no bearing on this particular case as the 
findings set forth the fact that A. T. Perry was a trustee 
for the plaintiff and there is substantial evidence to 
support this. 
The appellant contends that there should be. specific 
findings as to the elements constituting the trust to re-
quire there be specific findings on these facts would 
be entirely immaterial and incomp·etent. In order to 
overthrow the decree there must be evidence to the con-
trary that there has not been a trust established or the 
findings, if made, would not support the judgment and 
findings as made. ' 
Appellant cite·s Piper v. Eakle in 2 ·Pac. (2d) 909. 
In that case there were no findings at all on the counter 
claim and there was very much .dispute as to another 
material fact on which no findings were made. There-
fore, the court said there should be findings on these 
two particular points. However, at page 910 the court . 
held: · 
"That although a trial court erred in not 
making findings upon all of the material issues 
where it appears that no finqings other than in 
support of the judgment would have been pe·r-
missible, the judgment will be affirmed." Citing 
Snyder v. Allen. 
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We. construe that to be the law .. in 'this particular 
instance and refer ·to Bancroft's Oode·Pleadinf}; Practice 
·and Remedies, Volurne-3 of·lO~Year··Supplem-ent, p·age 
2203,- Section 1668 \V hich states : · ·· · · . 
"Recent cases have applied the settled rlile 
that a judgment supported by findings will not 
be reversed for failure to find on a material issue 
where it appears that the findings if m1;1.de would 
have been adverse to the appellant." · 
.LL\.nd cites under footnote 6 a number of cases from 
numerous jurisdictions to support this proposition. 
Among the1n is the case of Mutual Life· Insu)rdnce Cb. 
,. . \ 
of New York v. Frank, 50 Pac. (2nd), page 48~, with par-
ticular direction to 485 where it quotes·: 
"Appellant contends that the court' erred by 
failing to find in accordance· with the evidence 
that the insured gave the .policies -to the. appellant 
by making her the beneficiary thereof' and deliver-
ing the instruments to her. The omission is harm-
less. It is apparent that specific findings on that 
subject would be adverse to the appellant.. A 
failure of the court to adopt findings upon an 
issue raised by answer is not rev:ersible error 
when the findings if made to support the j~dg~ 
ment would necessarily ·be adverse to the appel-
lant." 
Applying this. rule to the case _at. hand it is very 
clear fro!? the judgment. and .decree as enter~d that the 
findings if in support of the judgment and decree would 
·have been adverse to the appellant. Further, there is 
specific evidence of a promise on the p·art of A.· T. Perry, 
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·a predecessor in interest to the ap·pellant, to hold the 
property for the plaintiff and deed it to him when he 
became of age (pages 25, 26, 27, 29, 52, 53, 541 55, 62, 
63, 64, 69, 70, 71). This evidence was not even contro-
verted and the very physical facts which are admitted 
by the appellant tend to support the theory that the 
appellant claimed no ownership until and at a later date. 
There is also substantial evidence which is. not con-
troverted to indicate that a fiduciary relationship existed 
between the plaintiff and defendant, Alfred T. Perry .. 
The plaintiff was a boy of sixteen years of age, a rela-
tive of A. T. Perry, worked with A. T. Perry, and later 
lived with him, and A. T. Perry was a ·minister of the 
gospel (pages 19, 21, 27 and 35). None of these facts 
were controverted and in view of the app-arent very close 
relationship and the disparagement in the age there 
could have been only one conclusion or one finding if 
it had been made, that there was a fiduciary relation~ 
ship. This would be the only conclusion that could be 
drawn in support of the judgment and decree and if so 
it is not necessary to have a finding to support that pro-
position, as clearly shown by the law which has been 
cited, which is the prevailing rule of law as to this juris-
diction. 
The same facts of evidence as set forth above would 
clearly indicate that if a finding had been made on a 
confidential relationship, there could have been only one 
result, namely, that a confidential relationship existed. 
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So the court, if the Jinding had been made, could only 
have found: (a) that the appellant or predecessor in in-
terest promised to hold the property for the plaintiff and 
deed to him at a later time; and (b) that either or both.a 
confidential or fiduciary relationship existed or even fur-
. 
ther that .A ... T. Perry fraudulently obtained the money 
intending to have his wife's name put on the contract 
to defeat the trust. In the first instance the constructive 
trust could be established by the relationship and in the 
second instance there would be fraud and a constructive 
trust ex maleficio could be imposed, which in either case 
would support the Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
and Decree, and as stated where it appears that the find-
ings if made would be adverse to the appellant, if made, 
the judgment will not be reversed for failure to find on 
a material issue. 
III. 
THAT THE FINDINGS ON THE MATERIAL ISSUES 
ARE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT. 
The court is referred to the original findings (page 
115) the· ~ute order of November 16 (page 123) which 
order clearly indicates that all findings and the judgment 
as originally entered are still in effect except as to the 
$400.00 lien, and to the amended findings (page 151). 
From the reading of these findings it is clear that 
the court found that the defendant A. L. Perry 'vas the 
trustee for the plaintiff and that any 1noney, if paid by 
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the Perrys, was paid for the use and .benefit of the plain-
tiff (see minute order (P. 123) ) and under all of the 
evidence as previously set (orth and the law -governing 
the sufficiency of findings in this case it is clear that the 
court has made sufficient findings to support the judg-
ment. (Refer to previous point for law and argument.) · 
IV. 
THAT THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUP-
PORT THE DECREE THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED 
TO THE FULL BENEFICIAL INTEREST IN THE PROP-
ERTY. 
After this case has been tried and argued to the 
Court, the trial judge made the following observation 
from which we. make a verbatim quotation. "Now the 
·burden thereof, Mr. Shelton, if you want to assume it, i~ 
to establish that, as a matter of law, Mrs. Perry stands 
in .any better posi.~ion~ than IY!r. Perry would in regard 
to this pr'operty." The Court further said "Or, putting 
it another way, sup-pose this had been a deed, now to 
them in joint tenancy, which Mr. Perry_ had negotiated 
and had~ just put his wife in as a joint tenant with him, 
and he died hefore the property was conveyed so that the 
title would vest in entirety in her, could she avoid the 
trusteeship;~ In other words, could he avoid his trustee~ 
ship by simply taking a deed and making sorne one else 
·a co-tenant or joint-tenant with him, and then dying~" 
Counsel for the defendant, Lorene Perry never did 
I# 
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either in his oral argument or in his written brief attempt 
to answer the .legal proposition as above stated by the 
trial court. We have ~onsistently taken the position that 
as a general rule of law, it is clearly established that the 
beneficiary of a trust can follow the property into the 
hands of any third person, unless said third person is ·a 
bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration without 
notice. 
Mrs. Perry in her examination on the witness stand 
never once contended that she was either (a). a bona fide 
purchaser, or (b) that she gave valuable consideration 
for her alleged claim to tills real property. At the most, 
the claim of Mrs. Perry and her counsel was to the effect 
that her husband had p-aid s·ome money towards. the pur-
chase price, and that was one reason why she was entitled 
to an interest in the property. The evidence clearly 
discloses that Mrs. Perry herself never p-aid anything 
except a claimed $50.00 for her alleged claim, and any 
alleged in the property is based only on the mere fact 
that her husband placed her name on the deed, and that 
as a result thereof, she became his joint owner in the 
property. There is no evidence of any kind to show. that 
she was even involved in the transaction between th~ 
plaintiff and her divorced husband (pages 81-82") .. In 
answe-r to questions p·ropounded by her attorney, Mr. 
Shelton, we quote verbatim (p. 81): 
"Q. Was there ever any conversation between 
you and Mr. Perry and Hawkins concerning 
:.;., 
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the purchase of this proper~y at· 22·3 East 7th 
S:outh~ 
A. Not a thing. I never knew anything about it, 
heard anything about it, until this past year 
after the court had signed me my decree 
granting me that. That is when all this junk 
came up· about this property." 
We cite: 
"It is a clearly established principle in 
equity jurisprudence that whenever a trustee has 
been guilty of a breach of trust, and has trans-
ferred, by sale or otherwise, the trust property 
or funds to any third person, the cestui que trust 
has full right to follow such property or funds into 
the hands of such person unless he stands in the 
predicament of a bona fide purchaser for a valu-
able consideration without notice.· Oliver v. Piatt, 
(1845} 3 How. (U.S.) 333, 11 L. ed. 622. 
"The general rule is that the beneficiary who 
can trace his money or property misappropriated 
by the trustee may recover it from any transferee 
who did not receive it for value without notice of 
its character. Van Alen v. American Nat. Bank 
(1873) 52 N. Y. 1." 
Further, Am. Jur. Volume 54, Section 272 on trus-
tees, at page 215 states : 
"That marriage, relationship between a trus-
tee and his transferee does not constitute such 
value as to cut off equities of a beneficiary in 
trust property or funds in the hands of the trans-
feree." 
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In support of this proposition in Hungerferd v. 
C1l,rtis, 110 .A.tlantic 650, the Court held that the- deposit 
of trust funds in the name of a wife, did not entitle the 
wife to the funds and that they could be ;recovered. 
In Tiffany on real property, at page 1093, Section 
483, it is stated: 
"In order to claim priority as against one 
'vhose rights have first accrued, one must be a 
purchaser for value, and one who receives a con-
veyance based on a merely 'good,' as distinguished 
from a 'valuable,' consideration, takes subject to 
all prior conveyances or incumbrances." 
It further states : 
"One is not a purchaser for a valuable con-
sideration, within the rule, unless he has parted 
with money or money's worth in consideration of 
the conveyance." 
Counsel for the defendant during the oral arguments 
at the conclusion of the trial, contended among other 
things, that the divorce decree gave her the interest of her 
divorced husband in lieu of alimony, and, therefore, she 
took whatever interest her husband had in said property 
and gave a valuahle consideration. 
To refute tnis contention, the divorce decree intro-
duced in the case of Lorene Perry v. Alfred T. Perry, No. 
87337 in the Third Judicial District Court, and we par-
ticularly called to the trial court's attention, paragraphs 
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3, 4, 5 ·and 6 of that decree. In paragraph 3 of the decree, 
she was awarded the custody of the minor children. In 
paragraph 4 of said decree she was awarded all of de-
fendant's interest in and to the ho"ll:sehold furnishings. 
In paragraph 5 of said decree, she was awarded $15 per 
month for each of the five children as support money, 
and in paragraph 6 of said decree she was awarded $15 
per month as alimony. Therefore, the appellant's conten-
tion above mentioned falls flat because of the express 
provisions in said decree as enumerated above. 
It is significant to note that Mrs. Perry never at any 
time made any demand for the regular payment to her of 
any money received ~from rent of the premises, and it is 
further significant to note that from 1943 or 1944 until 
the divorce was granted in 1950, a period of about seven 
years did Mrs. Lorene Perry, the appellant in this case, 
ever assert verbally, in writing, or by attorney or by 
agent; that she was the owner of, or the part owner, or 
real property in question until after her divorce decree 
that she claimed anf right, title or interest in and to the 
was granted to her (page 100). When she· moved to Salt 
Lake ·city in August of 1949 she didn't go to 223 East 7th 
South Street in Salt Lake City, and say to Mr. or Mrs. 
Hawkins or to the both of them "This is my house, you 
are only the caretaker here, I am going to move in and 
take possession of my property." She never even went 
near the Hawkins' and she never went near the real prop-
erty in question, but instead she took rooms at the St. 
Louis Hotel, 243 West South Temple in Salt Lake City 
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for two months (page 103). Then she went to Ogden and 
stayed for two or three weeks, and then she moved to 
a Mrs. Washington's house and stayed there approxi-
mately ten days to two weeks (page 104), and then sh_e 
went to Portland, Oregon, 'vhere she stayed until she 
secured her divorce (page 105). Does this appear to he 
the norinal conduct of a person who later comes into 
Court and claims the o'vnership to a valuable piece of 
property1 It is significant to note that after she secured 
her divorce decree and learned that the decree provided 
that she might have some interest in the real pTope,rty 
here involved, she retained an attorney to serve a notice 
on the plaintiff herein in which she aske·d for possession 
of the premises, but never made any demand for any 
back rent (p. 109). She admitted on the stand that she 
wanted the property for herself and that she even tried 
to get a loan on the property although she had· not even 
once in seven years, advised the plaintiff that she felt 
she had an interest in said real property. 
vVe therefore submit to the court from the facts as 
shown by the transcript and from the law as quoted 
above, it is very clear that a trust was established; that 
there is very little evidence that the defendant Lorene 
Perry at any time paid anything for the property which 
she now claims, that she stands in no better position than 
her divorced husband stood at the time the divorce de-
cree was entered, and that she gave nothing in the way of 
a valuable consideration for the recital in the divorce de-
cree in her favor. To hold otherwise but have the effect 
2f-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of quieting title and--determining rights as against per-
sons, not parties to a suit, which is contrary to law and 
equity. 
We submit this final questio.n to the court in sub-
stanti~tion of our position. Let us assume no divorce 
decree had been entered as between the Perrys, could 
Mr. Perry himself by any stretch of the imagination suc-
cessfully defend the action herein brought by the plain-
tiff~ In view of the fact that four witnesses have testi-
fied under oath that when the plaintiff paid the $300 to 
Perry, that Perry agreed to purchase the property in his 
own name and hold the same for· the plaintiff, who was 
then a minor, could Perry now come into court and say, 
"this property is mine because I paid some· of my money 
along with the purchase price money advanced by the 
plaintiff~" The answer is obvious, Perry himself would-
n't have a leg to stand on - and if he didn't ha:ve any 
right, title and interest in the property, how then can his 
wife now successfully contend that she is the owner of 
pro:rerty which she received from her divorced husband, 
who didn't own the property himself~ 
We also again· refer to the evidence which was un-
controverted that the money paid to A. T. Perry under 
an agreement to transfer to the plaintiff when he be.came 
of age and fact of the confidential or fiduciary relation-
ship ·is clearly shown by the evidence. 
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IV. (a) 
HEARSAY EVIDENCE AS TO LORENE PERRY AS 
BEING DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST .. 
The appellant makes much of the fact that the testi-
Inony was hearsay as to Lorene Perry. This is true as it 
was made out of her presence. However, there is a well 
established rule of law which permits the introduction 
of statements which are declarations against interest. 
Appellant contends that the statements could not be 
heard against Lorene Perry. As previously p,ointed out 
she was in exactly the same position as A. T. Perry, as she 
was a successor in interest to A. T .. Perry not being a 
bona fide purchaser and therefore subject to all the de-
fenses which might be raised as against A. T. Perry. 
It has been clearly established that such is the case 
when the court held in effect that Lorene Perry was not a 
bona fide purchaser. 
It has been brought out in appellant's brief that be-
fore a declaration against interest is admissible the de-
clarant must have some present interest at the time the 
statement is made. This is only another way of saying 
that declarant cannot make a statement against interest 
if he has no interest. For example: "A" says I am 
going to deed the State Fair Grounds to "B" to be held 
in trust for "C." At the time "A" makes the statement 
"A" does not own any interest whatsoever in the State 
Fair Grounds. "A" later acquires the title to the State 
Fair Grounds and subsequently makes a deed to "B" 
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without at that time saying anything about a trust in 
favor of "C." It is held that the early statement about 
the trust is not admissible as it was not against declar-
ant's interest at the ti1ne it was made. 
This would not be true in the present instance as 
there would clearly be a declaration against interest as 
A. T. Perry received the. $300.00 for a specific purpose 
and he actually had possession of the money at the time 
of making the statements and any statements made by 
him in derrogation of his right of ownership of the money 
or in derrogation of his right to use it as he saw fit would 
clearly be admissible as a declaration against interest. 
The fact that he did not then have an interest in the· prop-
erty would be immaterial, as· his declaration is as to the 
m0ney and the statements were clearly against his inter-
est and would be adn1issible to show under what ter1ns 
and conditions A. T. Perry accepted the money. 
In Jones on evidence, Second Edition, Page 1789, · 
s.ection 975, it states: 
. "Admission made by a party or one in privity 
to a party need only have been made at son1e time 
during an existence of an interest contrary to such 
admission in order to be admissible." 
This is clearly true in this instance as the statement 
contrary to the interest of A. T. Perry was to the effect 
that he was accepting the money with the idea that the 
property would be taken in his narne and held in trust 
for the plaintiff. .-
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In foot note under Section 975 is quoted fro1n Bibb v. 
Hunter, 79 Ala. 351 as follows: 
~'A declaration of trust made by the trustee 
at the tin1e of the creation of the trust has been 
held sufficient to establish the existence the-reof 
as against hin1." 
This is supported by nun1erous cases as cited. 
In .i.ll oore v. Butler, 48 New Han1pshire 161, it states: 
~'However, a declaration of trust 1nade by a 
trustee has been held to be binding." 
In the last two cases these would be just as admis-
sible against a privity of interest with the trustee as is 
clearly shown in Jones on Evidence. 
In further support of the theory that the statements 
I 
could be used, Jones on Evidence, Vol. 2, Second Ed. 
Page 1776 states : 
"Declarations of a husband made at the time 
of purchase of certain property as to whether he 
was buying for himself or his wife and as to 
whose money was paying for the land are admis-
sible on the issue as to whether a trust in favor of 
the wife results." 
Applying the principal stated in the ab~ve para-
graphs "a fortiori" there would be more reason to hoJd 
statements as to the purpose of the purchase in the cre-
ation of the trust as being admissible against a party 
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other than a wife than there would be where the trust 
was in favor of the wife. 
The case of McDonald v. Miller 16 Northwestern 
2d Page 270, supports the view of Haws v. Jensen in 
practically every particular and states: 
"In an action to establish a constructive trust 
in connection with a conveyance of real estate a 
declaration of the grantor made prior to or con-
temporaneously with an execution and delivery 
of conveyance were admissible in support of a 
trust under heresay rule .... " 
And further states : 
"There are two principles upon which a court 
of equity acts in exercizing its remedial jurisdic-
tion .... One is that it will not permit the Statute 
of Frauds to be used in an instrun1ent of fraud 
and the other that when a person through the in-
fluence of a confidential relation acquires title to 
property or obtains an advantage which he cannot 
conscientously retain, the court to prevent the 
abuse of confidence will grant relief." 
From the above citations there can only be one con-
clusion, namely: That the statements as to the trust are 
declarations a,gainst the interest of A.T. Petry and as 
such were admissible as to any p.arties in privity with 
him or successors in interest to him who are not bona 
fide purchasers. 
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v. 
THAT THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO WAR-
RANT FINDINGS \VHICH WOULD SUPPORT THE AWARD-
ING OF A $400.00 LIEN AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF'S IN-
TEREST, OR TO TAX COSTS AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF 
AND ASSESS PLAINTIFF AN ATTORNEY'S FEE OF 
$50.00 IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT, SCHRIEVER. 
It is very clear that the order granting a $400.00 lien 
on the property in favor of the appellant was made to ap-
pease or mollify the appellant as there is not sufficient 
evidence in the record to indicate that appellant or her 
husband paid n1oney as stated. 
We have filed a cross appeal from the order o.f _the _ 
court from paragraph 3 of the amended decree signed by 
the trial judge in which the plaintiff was ordered to pay 
to defendant, Thelma Catherine Scriever, the sum of $50 
for the use and benefit of her attorney, and also with re-
spect to paragraph 5 herein, the court , required each 
party to bear his owri costs. Concerning the award of 
attorney's fees to Mrs~ Scriever, we are unable to find 
any statutory authority granting the court authority 
to make such an award, nor do we find any case ever cited 
by the Supreme Court of this state that would justify 
the trial court to make such an award, and we, there-
fore, pray that that portion of the Court's order be re-
versed. 
We also cross appealed fro1n paragraph 2 of the 
an1ended decree entered December 11, 1951 wherein the 
30 
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defendant, Lorene Perry was allowed the sum of $400 
and interest from July 15, 1943 at the rate of 6%. Since 
the court in its amended decree found that the plaintiff 
was entitled to judgment against the defendant, and de-
claring that he is the true and lawful purchaser under 
the uniform real estate contract of July 15, 1943, and that. 
the defendants, Alfred T. Perry had no right, title or in-
terest in said property except said $400, we contend that 
being the prevailing party we are entitled to have the 
costs taxed against the defendant, Lorene Perry, and 
we further submit that the uncorroborated statement of 
the defendant that she or her husband paid $100 a month 
for five or six months, without producing any receipts 
in court or without producing any records or documents 
by the party to whom the alleged payments were made, 
is nothing but a self-serving statement and was made 
sole~y for the purpose of trying to salvage something 
out of the property in the event that the court ruled 
against her (page 79). 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent respectfully represents to the 
Honorable c·ourt that the judgment of the lower court 
should be sustained as to-the imposition of the trust as 
there is ample and sufficient evidence to support ·an the 
necessary findings and to support the judgment and de-
cree as entered, giving the respondents the full, benefi-
cial interest in the property. 
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That the respondents' cross appeal be granted and 
the lien and costs as asse-ssed against the respondent be 
stricken and disallo,ved. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOTHAIRE R .. RICH 
FAUX, RICH and KIRTON 
and 
RAYMOND R. BRADY 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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